This paper is a response to Dr Shinebourne's response to my recent paper assessing the relative merits of the Staffordshire Protocol on covert video surveillance. Dr Shinebourne does not take the opportunity to rebut the criticisms made of the text of the protocol. It is further suggested that judicial oversight of the use of CVS might accord the process a degree ofproportionality.
(a) I say CVS is to film parents at the bedside of children, when actually it is the children being filmed. This distinction seems overly semantic when the Staffordshire Protocol is replete with references to the need for secrecy from the parents, the need for a mental health nurse to be present if possible, the need for the swift entrance of nursing staff if an abusive incident is observed, etc etc. (b) I say CVS was first used in Staffordshire when it was actually London. In fact I only said it had "been developed" at Staffordshire; in an earlier publication I unequivocally state that "CVS was introduced into the UK by consultants at the Royal Brompton Hospital in London".3 One of the developments we did not see in London, has been the widespread publication of the protocol prepared in Staffordshire. (c) I state that "CVS is a form of research that has not been subject to reviews by any local research ethics committee". The statement was based on Evans.4 It is withdrawn as we now know "the protocol was presented to the research ethics committee of the Brompton Hospital, where after extensive debate it was approved". Shineboume's decision "not (to) deal with textual details" in his response, means he loses an opportunity to comment on the protocol and its relationship to confidentiality, the Access to Health Records Act 1990, the use of strategy meetings rather than child protection conferences, the anomaly of using CVS whilst care proceedings are already in progress, the secure storage of videotapes and other matters raised in my article. Why the opportunity was not taken is not known.
Shineboume asks the question: "what possible harm is done to the parents" by CVS. Later he suggests "CVS is a diagnostic activity that causes no harm to the child".
The actual running of a video camera is no doubt harmless, much as a gun lying unused on a table is harmless. What makes CVS "harmful" is the elaborate arrangements, deception (acknowledged as a harm by Shineboume) and breach of trust that is entered into. An operation so complex it requires a 21-page protocol to guide the personnel concerned and creates for them, what the protocol itself calls a "scenario of extreme emotional stress".
When I propose the possibility of "action" without CVS I am proposing the same action that takes place in the overwhelming majority of child protection work that does not use CVS. These are actions on a continuum from negotiated supervision through to care proceedings to gain a care order. Shineboume's reference to "trial separation" of a mother and child as being "cruel and harmful for the child and the mother" is confusing. There is no concept of "trial separation" in the Children Act or any other UK child care legislation; the term can only refer to something that is voluntarily entered into by the parents. Clearly if that was "cruel and harmful" to the mother she would not consent to it.
Shineboume suggests a positive aspect of CVS is the helping of parents to "refute allegations" and prove their innocence. This would imply not only that innocent parents have in the past (in pre-CVS days) been wrongly accused, but also that there is almost an onus on parents to prove their innocence and "refute allegations". Natural justice has traditionally been premised on the belief that people are innocent until proved guilty, with the onus being on the accuser making the charge or allegation, to prove his or her case. To suggest the accused must prove his innocence, makes it easier for the accusers to allege, and turns traditional justice on (d) the public could take over some of these "difficult ethical decisions" through the medium of the courts.
I have elsewhere argued that CVS might properly be the subject of judicial oversight.5 Leave of the court could be sought every time CVS is being considered and not just when care proceedings have started, as the protocol currently requires. Applications could be "ex parte" to protect the secrecy; the court could be empowered to make other orders if it felt the evidence already existed without recourse to CVS. A court saying "no" to CVS would not be "criticising those who are endeavouring to do the best possible for the child" but simply adding a degree of detachment and proportionality to those "difficult ethical decisions" that have to be made. 
